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When can a donor (successfully) exit from an on-the-ground presence in a post-conflict state?  The 
answer, according to the analysis presented here, is in decades: figures well beyond what was 
originally envisioned when peacekeeping troops were first deployed.  In the specific cases of Liberia, 
Mozambique, Solomon Islands, and Timor-Leste considered here, the best case scenario for 
successful exit ranges from 15 to 27 years.  Successful exit, for the purposes of this paper, entails the 
creation of the necessary fiscal space to fund the recurrent budget from internally generated revenues.  
This is a necessary, albeit, not sufficient condition for donor exit.  Of essence, however, is the time 
rather than the dollar value of support provided.  An extended donor presence, it is argued, provides 
the space for the creation, sustenance, and maturation of institutions that are finally able to undergird 
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1.  Introduction  
In this paper we estimate the time and dollar costs of post-conflict rebuilding in Liberia, 
Mozambique, Solomon Islands, and Timor-Leste.  Our estimates, even under the most 
optimistic assumptions, suggest that it would be decades, possibly generations, before 
post-conflict states are ready to see donors leave.  It is not just fiscal space provided by 
donors that is critical to post-conflict reconstruction but rather the ‘breathing space’ 
provided through the on-the-ground presence of donors to permit the creation and 
consolidation of institutions able to support economic activity and under-gird the state 
from failure.  The last requires time: a lot more time than what donors (and the states 
themselves) may have originally envisioned.  While donor commitment over decades has 
costs, both direct and induced through problems of moral hazard when such support is 
assumed to last, it also offers the timeframe to work through strategies to enable an 
orderly and timely exit.   
 
Let us be specific on what we mean by donor exit.  State-viability requires the 
satisfaction of several necessary conditions.  Maintaining a monopoly on the use of 
coercive force being one, but less obvious is also retaining a monopoly on taxation.  
Modern states are also expected to be able to provide a number of basic public goods 
such as law and order, basic healthcare, primary education, etc.  We concentrate on a 
single necessary condition; that of being able to fund the recurrent budget from internally 
generated revenues, for sovereignty.  True sovereignty, as noted by Ghani et al (2007) in 
the context of Afghanistan, is inconceivable without the above.  A necessary, albeit 
  2insufficient, condition for exit from post-conflict intervention, therefore, is the creation of 
the requisite fiscal space.  While the absence of any one of the necessary conditions is 
sufficient for non-exit, here we will only focus on the creation of the requisite fiscal-
space.  Time for donor exit, thus, is realized when the intervened state has acquired the 
capacity to fund its recurrent expenditure from domestic taxation; developmental 
assistance may very well continue after donor-exit. 
 
Why this research?  Lack of development, described as a failure to “progress toward 
stable, accountable and national institutions that can meet citizens’ needs”, as is common 
in fragile states, constitutes the greatest contemporary challenge to global prosperity 
(CGD, 2007: 11).  This is consistent with the observation of Fukuyama (2004) that: 
“weak, incompetent, or nonexistent governments has been and continues to be a source of 
severe difficulties” within the developing world (page 17).  Conflicts have invariably 
weighed down development (see table 1).  This research has been motivated by the void 
in the literature and within policy circles on a clear time frame and resource requirements 
for post-conflict reconstruction, including the rebuilding of the nation state itself.  Donors 
have on the whole been vague about the length of their commitment to reconstruction in 
post-conflict states.  They have been equally vague about the costs (and benefits) of such 
interventions.  Interventions into post-conflict states, ongoing as they are, have however 
guzzled up a significant amount of resources.  Not withstanding the poor quality of data 
on resources expended in post-conflict reconstruction, they have been expensive.  Our 
calculations shows some $16.91 billion dollars had been pledged for reconstruction 
purposes in a dozen post-conflict states (see tables 2 & 3).  This, moreover, may be an 
  3underestimate since pledging conferences have a time horizon of a few years only.  
Various missions into Haiti have cost the international community $1.3 billion, while 
interventions in Liberia have cost around $2.7 billion (see figures reported in tables 2 and 
3). Trends, moreover, suggest that post-conflict interventions may be far from over yet 
(see Fearon and Laitin, 2004; DFID, 2005).   
 
While state building is acknowledged as a time consuming and highly complex process, 
the imperatives for doing so in post-conflict states are stronger than elsewhere 
(Fukuyama, 2004; CGD, 2007).  A Commission set up by the US Government notes that: 
“War-torn societies are not healed in 12 months; weak and failing states 
cannot be rendered capable in two years. Transforming countries that have 
suffered decades of misrule, political dysfunction, economic distortion, 
and unchecked violence requires building consensus in the U.S. 
Government around strategies that extend beyond our one-year budget 
cycle and presidential elections that occur every four years.” (HELP 
Report, page 9; December 7, 2007, http://helpcommission.gov/). 
Little research to date has informed policymakers on what to do and how long to remain 
engaged in a post-conflict rescue, however.  The IMF, for example, notes that:  
“Given Liberia’s resource constraints and low level of income, restoration 
of physical infrastructure and achieving sustained high economic growth 
will require substantial external support for an extended period.” (IMF, 
2006: 35 – emphasis added) 
The Fund, however, does not define what it means by ‘substantial’ or ‘extended’.  For its 
part, the OECD’s Principles for Good International Engagement with Fragile States 
mentions that “capacity development in core institutions will normally require an 
engagement of at least ten years.”
1  USAID’s Fragile States Strategy does not mention 
time-frames, while the World Bank’s IDA 14 Reauthorization allows the provision of 
                                                 
1 Principles for Good Engagement with Fragile States.  (April 2007). 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf 
  4extra resources to post-conflict states for seven years.
2  Bilaterally, the situation is worse. 
The Australian government, for example, had provided for four years of budgetary 
funding to the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI).
3  The 
Prime Minister of Australia, however, had promised that RAMSI would remain ‘until the 
job was done’ (EPG, 2005; page 10).  What entailed the job being done was not clarified. 
Furthermore, it is now up to the new government to decide as to what RAMSI’s time 
frame may be. 
 
This paper makes two original contributions.  First, it computes time and resource costs 
to exit from four post-conflict states.  The figures on the length of time that donors need 
to remain engaged in post-conflict states ranges from 15 years for Liberia to 27 years for 
Timor-Leste.  These figures are purposefully conservative given the several optimistic 
assumptions made in generating them.  They, nonetheless, are startling as they far exceed 
what has been proposed by donors.  The World Bank’s 7 year plan for its engagement in 
post-conflict reconstruction falls short by a factor of two for all of the four post-conflict 
states studied here.  If our computations on the length of engagement of donors in post-
conflict rescue are to be believed, they throw up several fresh options on strategies to be 
pursued.  Some thoughts on what may be done differently when the length of engagement 
in post-conflict reconstruction is known in advance are proposed as the second original 
contribution of this paper.   
                                                 
2 USAID Fragile States Strategy (2005).  http://www.usaid.gov/policy/2005_fragile_states_strategy.pdf.  
World Bank’s Summary of Performance-Based Allocation System for IDA14 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/ANNEX1CPIA.pdf 
3 EPG’s External Assessment of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. 
http://www.ramsi.org/files/epg_report_final.doc.   
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We use the cases of four post-conflict nations to generate some explicit figures on ‘time 
to donor exit’ and the benefit-to-cost ratios of such undertakings.  Our figures, reported in 
table 5, are a sobering reminder that successful exit from post-conflict societies will, even 
under the most favorable assumptions, entail a lengthy donor-presence and cost several 
hundred million dollars.  Is this worth the effort?  Again, our figures suggest that the 
answer is in the affirmative for three of the four states scrutinized.  Mozambique, a post-
conflict nation furthest down the path to exit, and at current rate of growth of income 
would require donor support for at least another five years and funds to the tune of $0.8 
billion (at 2005 prices and from 2005 onwards).  Liberia, even if able to mimic the stellar 
performance of Mozambique, will need another 13 years (from 2005) and some $0.8 
billion to see donors off.  Solomon Islands on the same count will need some 23 years 
and a total of $2.1 billion in donor support.  Post-conflict rescue in Timor-Leste will 
require 21 years (from 2005) of donor support and cost some $2.1 billion.  All of the 
dollar-support, moreover, would be just for the recurrent budget.  This, on its own, is not 
sufficient for exit, but its absence is sufficient reason for continued donor-support. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 highlights the links between state 
strength and fiscal capacity, arguing that the creation of fiscal space is critical to reducing 
fragility.  It is the time taken to achieve the necessary fiscal space to fund recurrent 
(State) services that determines when donor-support becomes redundant.  Section 3 
considers post-conflict assistance in four states as a demonstration of the methodology 
discussed in the previous section.  Section 4 draws policy implications from the findings 
  6of the previous two sections.  Conclusions and suggestions for areas of further research 
bring the paper to a close. 
 
2.  State strength and fiscal capacity 
Why is it that state rebuilding in the 21
st Century is so much more resource intensive than 
similar efforts of the previous Century?  The Marshall Plan, the most celebrated of such 
rescues, for example, cost a paltry $13 billion (equal to some 3 percent of the combined 
GDP of the recipient nations) and lasted a measly 3 years.  De Long and Eichengreen 
(1991) attribute the success of “history’s most successful structural adjustment program” 
not so much to the transfer of resources but to the creation of market-friendly institutions.  
This observation resonates with the more recent claims from institutional economics 
(Olson, 1982; North, 1991; Acemoglu, 2005) that ‘institutions rule’ (Rodrik, et al 2004).  
While no two interventions are identical, the growing body of evidence on the critical 
role played by institutions in growth and development provide lessons on what may be 
done to undergird state failure.  The record on institution-building in intervened states is 
less than impressive, however. 
 
But why do states fail in the first place?  Chauvet et al (2007) attribute poor policies and 
governance that characterize failing states as: “observable manifestations of a 
dysfunctional society” (page 3).  They thus argue for interventions, much akin to those of 
the Marshall Plan, to change policies and governance in the intervened states.  A major 
difference, however, between the recipients of aid via the Marshall Plan and post conflict 
societies being assisted in the 21
st Century are that the former had the institutions – 
  7namely, the legal system and the enforcement mechanism in place – and the memory 
(norms) of a well functioning state, while prolonged conflicts have eroded both of the 
above in the latter group of countries.  Prolonged presence of donors in post-conflict 
societies, therefore, may be as valuable as the dollar value of resources expended in 
resurrecting these norms in state rebuilding.   
 
The key proposition of this section is that fiscal capacity is a necessary prerequisite to the 
restoration of state strength.  Fiscal capacity in this context refers to the ability of the 
state to raise sufficient revenues from internal sources to be able to fund the minimally 
required state services.  The most basic of these services comprises the ability to maintain 
law and order, which in turn requires the State to maintain a monopoly on the use of 
force, and the capacity to regulate private economic activity.  Furthermore, the norm for 
modern states has been that they fund basic public provision of primary education and 
healthcare, and some minimal level of physical (transportation and communications) 
infrastructure to induce trade and commerce.  All of the above need resources.  States fail 
when they lose their ability to meet these basic obligations.  For the purposes of this 
paper we assume that some minimal level of fiscal space, that is, recurrent revenues, is 
necessary for State-sustenance.  The actual dollar value required, even on a per capita 
basis, differs markedly across societies, as shown in the next section.  Weak states, thus, 
comprise those lacking: “the power to tax and regulate the economy and to withstand the 
political and social challenges from non-state actors” (Acemoglu, 2005: 1199).  Those 
states that succumb to violence from rival organizations descend into civil war and with it 
lose their fiscal capacity to sustain themselves – this we denote as the ‘bad equilibrium’. 
  8Climbing out of this situation on its own becomes close to impossible for the afflicted 
state.   
 
There is now a large and growing body of evidence suggesting that state services such as 
institutions to protect property rights is the minimum necessary for successful private 
enterprises.  Much of this literature stresses the role of public institutions in reducing 
transaction costs in a market economy.  Thus a growing economy that is able to fund 
improved public provision reaps the benefit of further growth, enjoying a virtuous cycle.  
Weak states are often caught in the opposite spiral; state failure results when the state is 
unable to provide security to its citizenry.  GDP and thus tax revenues collapse; evidence 
for this is shown in the next section.  Fiscal strength such as the power to tax and 
economic performance are not necessarily linearly related, however.
4  A leviathan ruler 
with powers to expropriate resources from the citizenry has incentives to invest in public 
provisions only under limited circumstances (see Acemoglu, 2005 on this).  But fiscal 
capacity for the weak (post-conflict) states considered in this paper, in all likelihood, lies 
below rather than above the optimal level a la Acemoglu (2005).  A post-conflict state, 
thus, may have landed itself in a trap: lacking the fiscal space to provide the minimal 
levels of public goods to induce enterprise that in turn keeps it starved of the necessary 
resources to climb out of its predicament on its own volition.  External intervention, thus, 
provides the opportunity to break out of this trap.  Doing so, however, requires both the 
creation of the necessary fiscal space and the institutions to undergird economic activity.  
But why should the externals intervene, particularly when doing so is expensive?  
                                                 
4  Acemoglu (2005) shows that there may be an ‘optimal’ level of state strength and that this is high only in 
‘consensually strong states’.  
  9Anarchy, as shown by Leeson (2005), may be efficient in some instances.  We address 
this issue later in the paper. 
 
The time required for donor exit from a post-conflict state is computed as that required 
for the creation of the requisite fiscal space.  That is, the year of donor exit, ‘t’, is when 
G – R(t) = 0      (1), 
where G denotes the steady state level of recurrent expenditures, while domestically 
generated budgetary revenues is given as 
R(t) = T(t)Y(t)     (2), 
where T denotes tax-take as a share of GDP (Y).  The total cost (C) of donor support to 














    (3), 
where δ denotes the discount rate and ‘0’ is the beginning of the post-conflict period.  
This ‘breathing space’ provided through to ‘t’ by the donors, moreover, may be the 
minimal necessary to under-gird subsequent state-failure.   
 
Unlike the Marshall Plan, the task of building institutions such as the norms of behavior, 
regulations, and agencies to enforce these are likely to take considerable time, a point 
made in a more general context by Besley and Persson (2007).  Both the political and 
economic institutions require rebuilding in post-conflict states (Acemoglu, 2005).  Here, 
for reasons of tractability, we focus exclusively on the internal revenue raising capacity 
of the state, realizing that growth of GDP necessitates the creation and sustenance of the 
institutions to undergird enterprise.  We also assume that peace is maintained post-
  10conflict; an assumption that has empirical support (Gilligan and Sergenti, 2007).  Thus, 
well-planned and sufficiently-timed interventions into post-conflict states have the 
potential to provide the breathing space for the economies subject to intervention to grow 
sufficiently to be able to fund their (steady-state/recurrent) obligations.  Donors may 
leave once such a stage has been reached, but developmental assistance may continue.  
We next apply this methodology to compute the time to exit in four post-conflict 
interventions. 
 
3.  Empirics 
Not withstanding problems with data quality, the cost of state provisions differs 
considerably across nations.  The capacity to tax, similarly, is just as varied.  This section 
uses all available information to compute the requisite (minimal) fiscal space for donor-
exit.  Figure 1 shows the levels of average per capita government consumption 
expenditure plotted against average per capita GDP for the 115 countries for which this 
data is available (see data appendix for data sources and variable descriptions).  The two 
are strongly correlated with the correlation coefficient of 0.95.  Countries with high per 
capita GDP, on average, collect more revenues and thus spend more on a per capita basis 
on government consumption.  Two observations from the cross-country data are pertinent 
to the analysis that follows.  First, revenue raising powers of a state depend more on per 
capita income rather than the tax-take as a share of GDP.  Second, per capita government 
expenditure differs enormously across states, even for those that may be considered as 
being strong.  The former observation points to the fact that raising fiscal space, in the 
main, is a challenge of raising income (GDP) rather than raising tax effort.  The second 
  11suggests that the steady-state level of recurrent outlays is country-specific where 
international norms are unlikely to apply.
5  
 
Fragile states, moreover, have on average not only lower levels of per capita GDP but 
also lower ratios of government expenditure and revenues to GDP.  Thus, fragile states 
are deficient in revenues and tend to spend less than their non-fragile counterparts on 
state services.  The lower expenditures and revenues peculiar to weak states, as discussed 
in the section above, is not evidence of causation but that of the joint determination of per 
capita income, tax collections, and outlays on ‘state services’.
6  An intervention into a 
failed state, thus, provides the opportunity to break out of the trap of limited fiscal space 
and state weakness.  The foreign intervention, in other words, can be thought of as a ‘big 
and sustained push’ to get the post-conflict state out of the ‘bad’ to the ‘good’ 
equilibrium (re Murphy et al, 1989); ‘sustained’, because the push continues until the 
intervened state attains the requisite fiscal space to sustain its recurrent provisions.  We 
next consider what may constitute the fiscal space that would render a post-conflict state 
free of the need for continued donor support to its recurrent budget.   
 
Here we will concentrate on recurrent (that is, steady-state) levels of government 
expenditure, abstracting from capital outlays and those associated with humanitarian 
assistance.  The level of recurrent government expenditure on a per capita basis, as shown 
above, varies considerably across countries.  This difference is due to several factors 
including country-size, population density, the degree of heterogeneity in the population, 
                                                 
5 Explaining why government expenditures differ so massively across countries is part of ongoing research 
6 Summary statistics on the cross-country data used for this analysis are given in Appendix Tables A1(a) to 
(c).   
  12the level of development, and the degree of openness of the economy (see Alesina and 
Spolaore, 2003; Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998; and Rodrik, 1996).  While fragile states, on 
average, have lower levels of per capita government consumption than others, the 
requisite level of expenditures to sustain a functioning state would be unique to the 
country in question.  The minimal level of recurrent expenditure that will enable 
Mozambique to sustain itself as a functioning and viable state, for example, is unique to 
Mozambique.  Our challenge is to get an estimate of this figure; an issue we address next.  
 
We use the level of recurrent expenditure as of 2005, a ‘normal’ (non-event) year in the 
four countries considered here as that necessary for state viability.  This is a critical and 
strong assumption for our analysis, thus extreme care has been taken in constructing this 
figure (see Appendix II for details on how this figure was constructed for the individual 
post-conflict countries considered here).  We have also undertaken robustness tests of our 
estimates on time to and cost of donor exit on alternate (historical) values for the growth 
parameter.  A narrower interpretation of our results would be the time necessary to enable 
the four post-conflict states studied here to be able to fund their recurrent outlays as of 
2005 from internally generated revenues.   
 
We consider the cases of four post-conflict nations, namely: (i) Mozambique; (ii) Liberia; 
(iii) Solomon Islands; and, (iv) Timor-Leste.  All are at different stages of post-conflict 
reconstruction.  Their selection was anything but random.  Mozambique has been 
selected as the model post-conflict state and one furthest along the path to exit on account 
of progress made in being able to fund its recurrent budget.  Liberia and Solomon Islands 
  13were chosen due to the availability of data, and the fact that post-conflict interventions 
began in 2003 and only a month apart, thus providing several useful comparisons.  
Timor-Leste was chosen, once again, for the availability of data and the fact that the 
nation may have access to resource rents to fund its recurrent budget but yet be in need of 
donor support for reasons other than for donor support to the recurrent budget as 
explained in some detail later.  Each of the countries has their idiosyncrasies, thus the 
individual cases are considered following some general remarks. 
 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of per capita GDP ten years before and ten years after the 
year of intervention, when such data is available, for the above-mentioned countries.  The 
horizontal axis plots time with the Year 0 denoting the year when peacekeepers first 
landed in the country and is interpreted as the commencement of the post-conflict era; 
that is, when conflict was brought to an end through external intervention.  In the case of 
Mozambique, Year 0 denotes 1992 when a UN negotiated peace agreement brought a 
long running civil conflict to an end.  In the case of Timor-Leste, Year 0 is 1999 when 
UN-sponsored peacekeeping troops, led by Australia, arrived.  For Liberia and Solomon 
Islands, Year 0 is 2003.  The vertical axis in Figure 2 shows per capita GDP, normalized 
to 100 at Year 0, for each of the four countries.   
 
Figure 2 shows that per capita GDP for Mozambique was on a roller coaster ride in the 
decade before cessation of conflict, but has grown at an annual average of 5 percent since 
then.  Per capita GDP had doubled in the 14 years since the end of conflict.  Even the 
devastating floods of March 2000, the worst recorded in half a century, did not place a 
  14dent on this growth.  However, the large humanitarian assistance that followed this 
disaster, shown in Figure 3, would have helped maintain the high rate of growth of GDP.  
Per capita GDP in Solomon Islands peaked some 7 years before the end of conflict (that 
is, in 1996), following which it rolled back to some 70 percent of its peak just before the 
conflict ended.  The sharpest fall in per capita GDP took place during the civil war; that 
is, from Year -4 (1999) to Year 0 (2003).  The recovery since then has been at an annual 
average rate of 2.5 percent.   
 
The collapse of per capita GDP in Liberia extends well before the 10-year window prior 
to the cessation of conflict; Figure 2 masks this long-term decline.  Figure 4 shows the 
simultaneous collapse in Liberian per capita GDP: from the high of US$745 (at 2000 
prices) in 1980 to the low of US$57 in 1995.  Per capita government consumption peaked 
at US$168 (at 2000 prices) in 1982 and had fallen to US$10 (at 2000 prices) in 2003.  Per 
capita GDP rose sharply from 1995 (Year -7 in Figure 2) to 2000 and then crashed in the 
year just preceding the UN intervention.  The record for Timor-Leste is less than enviable 
with per capita GDP heading south following a spike lasting two years after the arrival of 
the peacekeepers.  While the reasons for the changes in GDP for each of the above-
mentioned are a lot more complex than what has been discussed thus far, the purpose of 
Figure 2 is simply to provide the best case scenario, that of Mozambique, that a post-
conflict state can expect in terms of the rate of growth of per capita income.  Our first 
assumption involves overlaying the per-capita growth record of Mozambique, as the best 
case post-conflict scenario, on the remaining three post-conflict states.  We also use the 5 
  15percent per annum growth rate to extrapolate per capita GDP for Mozambique for future 
years. 
 
Our second squabble with the data has been in working out the extent to which donors 
have funded the recurrent budget of post-conflict states.  This has been less than a straight 
forward exercise.  Donors, on the whole, are notoriously bad in providing data on the 
level of support afforded to a country and even more so when it comes to the finer details 
of the particular activities funded.  We have used budget records, wherever available (see 
Appendix II for further details), and supplemented these with IMF sources and 
particularly their Article IV mission reports to decipher the levels of donor support to the 
recurrent budget.  Finally, we assume that donor exit is possible when the State is in a 
position to fund its recurrent budget with domestic taxation.  Fitting this final piece of the 
puzzle has been the least of the concerns since data on tax take as a share of GDP is 
available from the IMF.  Given the peculiarities of the data, the differences in the levels 
of per capita recurrent outlays, and the share of taxes and other sources of finances for the 
individual governments, we next consider the post-conflict states individually.  We begin 
with the case of Mozambique, given its role as the ‘model’ post-conflict state furthest 
along the path to donor-exit.  We later repeat this exercise for Liberia, Solomon Islands, 
and Timor-Leste.   
 
(i)  Mozambique 
Mozambique is the model post-conflict economy well on its way to seeing donors off in 
the next decade.  Since the end of its civil war in 1992, aggregate GDP has grown at an 
  16average annual rate of 8 percent, or, in per capita terms, of 5 percent.  The headcount 
index for poverty fell from 69 percent in 1997 to 54 percent in 2003.  Figure 3 shows 
government consumption and aid receipts on a per capita basis from 1980 to 2005.  Per 
capita aid receipts peaked at $139 in 2002, but a significant proportion of this aid was for 
relief in the aftermath of the devastating floods.  We have drawn on budget estimates and 
DAC data to reach a recurrent per-capita government expenditure figure as of 2005 of 
$67.20.  This, we assume, is the required steady-state value for the level of recurrent 
expenditure necessary to sustain a functioning Mozambican state.  Thus, the time for exit 
of donors from Mozambique is reached when this minimal value of revenues is generated 
from domestic taxation.  Policymakers have indeed expressed their desire to achieve such 
an outcome in the near future (see IMF, 2007: 20). 
 
On the revenue front, tax revenues raised as of 2005 amounted to 13.6 percent of GDP.  
The government has expressed its intention of ratcheting up tax take as a share of GDP 
by half a percentage point per year over the near future; this is to be achieved through 
broadening of the tax base and via improvements in revenue administration (IMF, 2007: 
15).  Thus, we use the starting values for per capita GDP and average tax take as a 
percent of GDP as for 2005 and roll this forward on the assumption that tax take as a 
share of GDP rises half a percentage point each year while per capita GDP growth is 
maintained at 5 percent per annum.  On these assumptions, government recurrent per 
capita expenditure as of 2005 of $67.20 is raised from domestic sources alone in 2010.  
Thus, our criteria suggest that donors can exit Mozambique in 2010.
7  The shortfall in 
                                                 
7 The time to exit involves a search for ‘t’ (the year) when the minimal recurrent outlays for state viability 
is funded with domestic taxation.   
  17recurrent outlays up until then, this being the revenue-gap, is assumed to be met by 
donors (re equations 2 and 3).  The total value of this support, in net present value terms 
as of 2005 at a discount rate of 5 percent and using population growth rates for 2005, 
amounts to $0.81 billion (at 2005 prices).   
 
In other words, our model post-conflict country would have taken a total of some 18 
years since the cessation of fighting to be in a position to be able to fund its recurrent 
provisions for state viability using domestic taxation.  Figure 5 depicts the evolution of 
per capita GDP, tax revenues, tax take as a share of GDP, and the revenue gap to fund 
recurrent provisions.  It also shows that the gap between recurrent per capita government 
expenditure and tax revenues generated locally disappears by 2010; thus, the implied date 
for exit by donors.  The final task for Mozambique is in figuring out if such an 
investment would be worth the trouble.
8  Chauvet et al (2007) estimate that the total 
expected cost of state failure for a typical failing state (with a population of 15 million), 
just in terms of loss of GDP for the residents, is $28 billion (page 7); they then add on 
another $3.5 loss in GDP due to a civil war and a further $3.7 in terms of increased 
mortality from the war.  We read the above total of $35 billion cost of state failure as the 
benefit of successfully rescuing a post-conflict state from rolling back into conflict.
9  The 
$0.8 billion cost of lifting Mozambique to the ‘good equilibrium’ is compared to the 
population-weighted benefit of $47 billion (that is 20/15 * $35 billion), derived from 
Chauvet at al (2007), gives a benefit to cost ratio of 57: 1.  In other words, a probability 
of success of the intervention of 2 percent or more would be a sound bet for a risk-neutral 
                                                 
8 We do not consider past donor support as this is ‘sunk’ costs for the purposes of this analysis. 
9 These figures must be taken as indicative only as they are generated with equally conservative 
assumptions. 
  18intervener.  These are indeed very crude estimates, but they suggest that continued 
support to the recurrent budget in Mozambique has a financial case for it.  More 
importantly, the probability of success can be influenced by the interveners, a point taken 
up in some detail in Section 4 of the paper. 
 
(ii)  Liberia  
Liberia’s is a sad story.  The nation is recovering from fifteen years of intermittent civil 
war that ended in 2003.  Per capita GDP fell 92 percent between 1980 and 1995
10; this is 
one of the largest recorded collapses in any economy ever (Radelet, 2007).  IMF (2006) 
notes that:  
“[t]he country’s physical infrastructure has been largely destroyed, 
government institutions lack the basic capacity for economic management, 
and the country’s once considerable human capital has been significantly 
eroded…. over 80 percent … of the population subsists on less than US$1 
a day, with no access to basic health, education, and other social services.” 
(IMF, 2006: 5) 
 
Ms. Antoinette M. Sayeh, the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Liberia noted in her 
statement to the Executive Board Meeting of the IMF on April 26, 2006 that: 
 
“Liberia is emerging from two decades of economic mismanagement and 
15 years of brutal civil war which devastated our economy and human 
assets, leaving deep scars in our social fabric. Our peace is still very 
fragile, made possible in large measure by the presence of some 15,000 
United Nations troops. Electricity is the privilege of the fortunate few who 
own and can purchase fuel for generators, as is running water. More than 
80 percent of our labor force is unemployed while basic education and 
health care remain unavailable or unaffordable for most of our children 
and people. There are still large numbers of internally displaced persons 
and ex-combatants who need to return to their homes and who require 
reintegration into Liberian society. We have accumulated huge external 
and domestic arrears, and our revenues and resources have been pillaged.”  
                                                 
10 Data sourced from World Development Indicators – see Data Appendix for details. 
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These statements are succinct summaries of the plight of the state and its inability to 
provide basic ‘state services’.  The plight of the people is worse, however.  Some 46 
percent of the population fell below the minimal level of dietary energy consumption 
while youth (that is, the 15 to 24 year cohort) illiteracy rates were reported at 71 percent 
(figures for 2003 from IMF (2006), page 65).  These are sobering statistics and a 
poignant reminder of the devastation of conflict on the wellbeing of the afflicted 
population.  They equally point to the daunting challenges of rebuilding a post-conflict 
state.  The authorities, both in Liberia and within the donor agencies, are cognizant of 
these challenges.  The IMF (2006) notes that: “[i]n light of external and domestic 
financing constraints, the authorities agreed that the budget should remain balanced for 
some time”; but then proceeds on to admit that rebuilding of Liberia would require 
“sustained external financial and technical assistance” (IMF, 2006: 10).  We next 
compute what the length of donor engagement and value of this support may be.   
 
An analogous methodology to that employed for Mozambique is used to generate the 
minimal time and budgetary support necessary to enable the economy to generate 
sufficient resources internally to fund its steady-state level of recurrent fiscal expenditure.  
The starting values for per capita GDP (of $167) and average tax take as a percent of 
GDP (of 14.5%) is that for 2005.  The values for the subsequent years are generated with 
the assumption that tax-take as a share of GDP rises by half a percentage point each year 
and that per capita GDP growth is maintained at 5 percent per annum.  Per capita 
recurrent government expenditure for 2005 of $63.13, at 2005 prices, has been assumed.  
This value is raised from domestic sources under the above assumptions by 2018; that is 
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with an assumed annual discount rate of 5 percent).  The benefit-to-cost ratio, using the 
same methodology as that for Mozambique, is 10:1 (that is, $7.7 billion: $0.76 billion).  
Alternatively, a probability of success with odds greater than one-tenth would be a bet 
taken up by a risk-neutral intervener. 
 
(iii)  Solomon Islands 
Peacekeepers comprising some 2,200 police and military personnel, led by Australia, 
landed in Honiara on 23 July 2003; just a month before the UN intervened in Liberia.  
Thus, these two post-conflict states provide many useful comparisons in state rebuilding.  
Logging, mostly of native forests and at an unsustainably high rate, as of 2006, accounted 
for some 70 percent of exports, 15 percent of domestic government revenues, and 10 
percent of GDP (IMF, 2007).  On current estimates, the stock of exportable stock of logs 
will run out by 2014.  Current government expenditure as of 2006 was approx 33 percent 
of GDP (IMF, 2007: 10)  Aid as a share of GDP, according to data from WDI, accounted 
for some 45 percent of GNI in 2004 and had climbed to 66 percent by 2005.  Grants from 
donors for developmental expenditure, net of police and military spending, amounted to 
some 35 percent of GDP (IMF, 2007; Table 3).  The level of donor support, high as they 
are, may be an under-estimate since the Fund notes that:  
“Development grants and grant-financed development spending are 
currently administered by donors, and hence are not under the direct 
control of the government. They exclude police and military spending, but 
include noncash grants. Data on aid flows are now being captured more 
accurately, and they indicate much higher levels than previously 
estimated.” (Footnote number 1; page 27) 
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returns such that even in the best policy environments, aid has zero impact on growth at a 
ceiling of 45 percent of GDP.
11  Aid has probably reached saturation point in Solomon 
Islands and is more than likely to be wound down in the near future.  The risk with the 
rescue of the Solomon Islands state, as shown by the broader international experience 
(see Elbadawi et al, 2007), is that aid will be withdrawn too quickly; and, if accompanied 
with a fall in log exports could cramp fiscal space rapidly enough to be destabilizing.  
The IMF, consistent with their standard mantra, has recommended that the local 
authorities: “maintain fiscal discipline and create additional fiscal space for priority 
spending within a medium-term framework” and that: “current expenditure would need 
to be reduced by some 3 percentage points of GDP, starting in 2008, to keep the primary 
domestic surplus at around ½ percent of GDP over the medium term” (IMF, 2007: 8 & 
9).  We return to the absurdness of these recommendations later. 
 
We once again run simulations on the minimal time necessary to generate the fiscal space 
for Solomon Islands to be able to fund its recurrent budget from internal sources.  In 
terms of the parameters used, the major difference is that the per capita cost of providing 
state-services in Solomon Islands is considerably larger and tax-take as a share of GDP 
considerably higher than the corresponding figures for Liberia and Mozambique (as well 
as Timor-Leste as shown later).  The starting value for per capita GDP of $624 and 
average tax take of 24.7 percent of GDP is for 2005.  The values for the subsequent years 
are generated with the assumption that tax-take as a share of GDP rises by 0.2 percentage 
                                                 
11 Clemens and Radelet (2003), particularly their table 2 on page 23, provide an excellent survey of this 
literature. 
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While the lower annual increment on tax-take than that assumed for Mozambique, 
Liberia, and Timor Leste (as shown later) has been assumed simply because Solomon 
Islands may be hitting the ceiling on this parameter, there are other policy motivations for 
doing so and these are explained in the next section.   
 
Per capita recurrent expenditure inclusive of donor support, even when provided outside 
of the budget, is estimated at $545 (see notes on how this figure has been reached in 
Appendix II).  This cost is some 8 times the corresponding figure for Mozambique and 
Liberia, and nearly thrice that of Timor-Leste.  Fiscal space to enable the generation of 
$545 per capita from internal sources at an assumed 5 per cent per capita growth rate of 
GDP and with tax take rising by 0.2 percentage point from the 24.7 percent from 2005 
takes a good 25 years; that to 2028.  Donors in the mean time would have funded a total 
revenue gap, in 2005 US$ as of 2005 with an assumed discount rate of 5 percent, to the 
tune of $2 billion.  The cost of not undertaking such a rescue, using population weighted 
figures from Chauvet at al (2007), would be $1.2 billion (that is, $35 billion/15*0.5) with 
a benefit to cost ratio of 1: 2 (see table 5).  The rescue of Solomon Islands, thus, does not 
have the same strong financial case as that for the previous two.  Diluting this case even 
further is the fact that the growth estimates for per capita GDP are well above those 
experienced over the post-conflict period (see table 6).  The message here is not that the 
rescue of Solomon Islands ought to be suspended, but that costs of state services need 
greater scrutiny given the inflation factors involved when compared to Mozambique, our 
model post-conflict state.  Incidentally, the state will in all likelihood face considerable 
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with an export collapse would be a recipe for a rollback into state failure through fiscal 
depletion.   
 
(iv)  Timor-Leste 
An exercise analogous to that of the above three was also undertaken for Timor-Leste.  
There are two issues unique to Timor-Leste: (i) it has better data on donor support to the 
recurrent budget (see IMF, 2007c); and, (ii) resource rents are projected to be sufficient to 
fund the estimated revenue gap.  On the latter, we concentrate solely on the growth of the 
non-mineral economy to generate the requisite fiscal space.  Resource rents, while 
providing revenues to the budget, are ignored as they create just as many problems and in 
the case of countries afflicted by the ‘resource curse’, even more.  The initial value of the 
non-oil per capita GDP figures has been used in the computations.  Other than the 
exceptions noted above, similar assumptions are made as for Mozambique in rolling the 
estimates for per capita GDP and tax revenues forward in time.  Assuming a growth rate 
of per capita non-oil GDP of 5 percent, the recurrent per capita government expenditure 
of $197 (at 2005 prices) of 2005 will be funded from non-oil GDP by 2026 and at a total 
cost of $2.1 billion (at 2005 prices summed from the Year 2005).  The WDI reports 
population growth rate of 5.5 percent, but this parameter cannot be taken seriously; thus 
an alternative estimate from the World Factbook of 2.13 percent has been used.  The 
benefit to cost ratio just evens out for Timor-Leste, but this may not be a constraint in this 
case as explained next. 
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budgetary revenues of $3 billion over the 2006 to 2010 period (IMF, 2007).  Does this 
render donor support redundant?  We do not believe so.  We are not even sure if the 
nation can borrow on this ‘future fund’.  As discussed in some detail in the next section, 
the key result from these simulations is the longevity of donor presence in post-conflict 
states to create the institutions that would undergird against a rollback to conflict on exit 
of externals.  Large resource rents and the political competition they induce, raise the 
risks of conflict, particularly in countries with weak institutions (see Collier, 2007b for an 
extensive survey).  Thus, Timor-Leste may not need the donor funds to meet the revenue 
gap estimated above, but will still need their on-the-ground presence for a good quarter 
century at least, to provide the timeframe for creation and maturation of institutions to 
prevent a rollback into state failure.  Furthermore, this timeframe may be an under-
estimate since institutions to manage the potential adverse ‘Dutch disease’ and ‘resource 
curse’ effects of the impending mineral boom also need to be imbedded.   
 
The empirics thus far has produced the following results: (i) successful exit from post-
conflict states, even under the most favorable assumptions, involves engagements 
exceeding a decade and more likely to have a time horizon of a quarter century; (ii) 
purely on benefit to cost considerations, interventions into two of the four post-conflict 
states considered are justified, even if the odds of success are 50 percent or less; (iii) 
Timor-Leste fails on the above but may already have the fiscal space while abnormally 
high recurrent public expenditures in Solomon Islands are responsible for its low benefit 
to cost ratio; and, (iv) it is the longevity of the interventions, particularly in the case of 
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conflict on donor-exit.  The policy implications of these observations are considered next.  
The value of this analysis is in its transparency and thus replicability.  The robustness of 
the key finding - that successful interventions require time frames much larger than what 
has been bandied around - is robust to large changes in the assumed parameters of the 
model.  
 
4.  Four policy lessons 
Four policy implications are drawn from the findings of the previous section.  These are: 
(i) the timeframe for interventions is longer than what has been envisaged by donors and 
the intervened; (ii) support for funding of ‘state services’, and in the main to the recurrent 
budget, is critical; (iii) budget support could be withdrawn with a simultaneous 
substitution of domestically generated revenue as part of a transparent process of 
reverting sovereignty back to the population of the intervened state; and, (iv) incentives 
for the interveners as much as the intervened to stay the full course have to be built into a 
compact at the initiation of the intervention/mission.  Each of the above-enumerated is 
elaborated upon next. 
 
First, clarity on a realistic timeframe to exit has several advantages.  Knowing what it 
takes to make a successful exit, both by the donors and the recipient, is likely to 
encourage a closer scrutiny of the costs and benefits of the planned rescue mission.  
Knowing what it takes for successful exit, the parties may simply choose not to take this 
option.  Agreeing to participate, knowing the costs, would be a signal of the degree of 
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a clear time horizon for successful exit of, say, a quarter century opens up several 
alternative options to the limited menu on offer when the time horizon is either short or 
unclear.  As an example, a perennial problem in post-conflict states is the lack of local 
capacity and there is the primary task of building this capacity.   
 
In the main, the strategies used thus far have relied heavily on the use of foreign 
personnel with local counterparts and short ‘crash’ courses to fill perceived (or otherwise) 
voids in available local skills.  In the case of Solomon Islands, for example, Australian 
public servants have been posted to Honiara as part of technical assistance for post-
conflict reconstruction.  A select group of local senior public servants were flown to 
Australia in 2004 for a three-month short course in economic policymaking at the 
Australian National University.  Most of the returnees were then placed as counterparts to 
the technical assistance team posted from Canberra to Honiara.  While these initiatives 
may have had some success and probably made sense then,
 12 a longer time horizon 
would have opened up the options of revamping local training, rebuilding schools and 
colleges, overhauling the school curriculum, and offering more scholarships to school 
leavers for specialized training abroad.  A quarter-century time horizon provides the 
space to build local capacity from the bottom up.  A longer time horizon necessitates 
milestones to track progress, but it also offers alternative options for improving the 
effectiveness of donor-support.  It creates the space to use progress-based aid (Barder and 
Birdsall, 2006; Birdsall, et al 2007), as a specific case in point.  Most importantly, long-
                                                 
12 One of the authors who taught these trainees, on a return visit in June 2007, discovered that most of those 
trained had moved on to other jobs, both at home and abroad. 
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the United Nations or World Bank since bilateral arrangements lack credibility over such 
a time horizon.   
 
Second, state failure is evidenced by the void in provision of and demand for state 
services.  This, as shown in section 2 above, could constitute a trap: states lacking fiscal 
space are unable to fund the very basic public goods that in turn depress investment and 
growth of the economy.  Post-conflict reconstruction, therefore, entails the lifting of a 
fragile state out of the low equilibrium trap to a (stable – to avoid a roll-back, and) high 
equilibrium.  While the distinction between recurrent and capital outlays, in our view, is 
artificial, the fact remains that budgets are and will remain split between the two.  
Expenditure on salaries and consumables relating to providing basic education and 
healthcare is part of the recurrent budget when these clearly are investments into building 
human capital.  Donors, however, happily fund the construction of a school building that 
shelters the child during classes but shy away from funding teacher salaries as this is part 
of the recurrent budget.  In the few exceptions, such funding is provided outside the 
recurrent budget.  The longer time horizon for post-conflict reconstruction provides 
compelling reasons for budget-support.  In this case, donors can lead by funding access to 
basic public goods, such as the provision of security to person and property that are 
critical to investment and thus growth of the economy.  Tax rates could subsequently be 
raised, but from a low base, as an explicit compact between the government and the 
governed for improved access to basic services.  Such a compact could form the basis for 
a transparent process of earning back sovereignty and with it seeing donor presence being 
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generated sources lends itself as a transparent milestone towards exit of donors from 
having a role in providing public services. 
 
On this last point, the IMF is wrong in pushing for greater taxation early in the post-
conflict stage to keep the budget balanced in Solomon Islands.  This proposal is 
problematic for several reasons, including the following three: (i) citizens in post-conflict 
states are deprived of the most basic services; thus increased taxation without a 
commensurate increase in access to quality public services is imprudent; (ii), a premature 
rise in taxation is only likely to shrink the tax base, thus could be counter-productive; and 
(iii), post-conflict states with weak institutions are prone to corruption; thus raising taxes 
prematurely is only likely to exacerbate the problems of poor governance.
13  The 
premature raising of tax rates could already be a problem in Solomon Islands.  Amongst 
the four post-conflict states examined here, Solomon Islands has an unusually high tax-
to-GDP ratio.  This, in all likelihood, is weighing down the growth of the formal 
economy.  It, thus, would make sense to lower the tax rates – as is being done in Liberia, 
and with some success - with a view to attracting more businesses into the formal 
economy.  The broad message here is that the recurrent budget in post-conflict states 
could be funded via donor resources with an explicit link to growth of the economy and 
with it the weaning of such support and the gradual handing back of sovereignty. 
 
                                                 
13 The Jakarta Post, for example notes in its editorial of 23
rd October 2007 that: “[f]or more than three 
decades now the tax office has been perceived by the public as among the most corrupt public institutions 
in the country, with many of its officials living conspicuously far beyond their official means.” 
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rebuilding is that of creating and sustaining institutions to maturation given their role in 
growth (Rodrik, 2004).  While the support of donor resources is necessary, and possibly 
the most visible, the greater value of an extended and assured donor presence in a post-
conflict state with a clear goal and timeframe for exit is the certainty it brings both to the 
local population and international investors.  Prolonged donor presence with an entire 
generation having grown up within a functioning state creates norms that could act as a 
backstop against regression.  Regular and sustained access to information on the quantity 
and quality of services provided, the costs of these provisions, and the sources of funding 
for them is likely to instill norms within the population that remain when donors have 
exited the scene.   
 
Part of creating state institutions will involve raising taxes, but this should be part of the 
bargain for regaining the rights to full sovereignty (see Besley and Persson, 2007; Fearon 
and Laitin, 2004).  An exit strategy with clear milestones to track progress towards exit is 
likely to mitigate the risks of mission-creep (both on the time frame and breadth of issues 
covered) on the part of donors and problems of moral hazard on the part of the 
intervened.  We address this issue next. 
 
Fourth, incentives to induce all parties to stay the full course of the compact have to be 
created.  This could be done by building in rewards for abiding by the compact and 
penalties for defection from the agreed strategy ex-post.  The common urge with any 
rescue is to ‘give up’ early, particularly when some relief is attained.  How can we 
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Addressing this issue is particularly important given the long time frames canvassed in 
(1) above.  We know that states agreeing to such a rescue will be those likely to stay the 
course, but this on its own may not be enough.  We hazard a new proposal: that of a 
compact between the intervened and the interveners with penalties for a premature bail-
out by either party.  Such a compact would be agreed to at the initiation of the 
intervention and contain penalties for breach of contract.  As an example, the intervened 
state could pay-out the intervener for the support provided to date to the recurrent budget 
for a premature bail-out from the program – in essence, they are buying out sovereignty.  
Similarly, the intervener could bailout of the rescue by paying out the balance of the 
recurrent budget support in the compact.
14  A salient message from this section is that 
‘sovereignty is not free’ and neither is the rescue of a failed or failing state.  A 
meaningful and transparent basis for sharing the costs of rescue can be part of a compact 
for post-conflict reconstruction.




5.  Conclusions 
The bulk of this paper has been an accounting exercise.  We have estimated the time 
necessary to enable post-conflict states to grow sufficiently to be able to fund their 
recurrent budget – the minimal necessary to keep the machinery of the state operating—
                                                 
14 This is akin to a finite-length marriage contract with transparent conditions for a premature divorce.  This 
exercise, we believe, is best managed multilaterally with any returned funds placed in a ‘venture fund’ to be 
used for rescue of the ‘next-best’ fragile or failed state. 
15 This could build on “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States” by OECD; see: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/46/0,3343,en_2649_33693550_35233262_1_1_1_1,00.html
 
  31this being our criterion for donor-exit.  We show that exit from post-conflict states will 
take decades and cost billions of dollars - a lot more than what was initially envisioned in 
all of the cases considered here.  Clemens and Radelet (2003) come to a similar 
timeframe for a successful exit of the Millennium Challenge Corporation from states with 
which it has engaged.  We also show that the interventions, at least on strictly cost-
benefit terms, are worth the outlays in three of the four post-conflict states considered 
here.   
 
The salient message of the paper is that a lengthy engagement of externals in post-
conflict states is critical to the creation and maturation of institutions necessary to prevent 
a rollback into state failure on the departure of the interveners.  We have also emphasized 
the need for donors to support the recurrent budget; not withstanding the fact that the 
distinction between recurrent and capital outlays in the budget is both artificial and 
possibly unhelpful. 
 
We turn next to the question of why is it that post-conflict reconstruction is such a 
lengthy process.  The comparisons with the Marshall Plan, on this front, could not be 
starker.  Part of the answer lies in the fact that the post World War II reconstruction was 
more about rebuilding physical rather than social infrastructure, with the latter being 
more time (and resource) intensive than the former.  Rebuilding physical infrastructure, 
as the post-2004 tsunami efforts in Asia show, is a relatively quick process.  Creating the 
fiscal space for state viability, as shown here, is time-intensive.  State building, similarly, 
often involves the creation and ‘deep-rooting’ of institutions and organizations – 
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be an integral part of institutional strengthening.  Absent such lengthy engagements with 
clear time-frames and milestones for exit, the chances are that a post-conflict state will 
roll back into conflict (that is, to the ‘bad’ equilibrium) once external support is 
withdrawn.   
 
Post-conflict interventions of the 21
st Century have involved the rebuilding of both the 
destroyed physical and social infrastructure.  Extended conflicts create self-perpetuating 
forces – that is, a conflict trap, making it difficult for countries in conflict to muster 
sufficient fiscal space to provide state services and break-out of their predicament on 
their own.  Poor and limited access to basic services and low levels of income, as 
demonstrated by the predicament of Liberia, are symptomatic of the above.  Civil wars, 
on average, last some 7 years (Collier, 2007a); a period long enough to destroy many of 
the institutions of civil society including the memory within the afflicted population of 
the norms of a functioning state.  Donor interventions to extinguish conflicts, and post-
conflict reconstruction, thus, provide the window of opportunity to lift the afflicted state 
from the ‘bad’ to the ‘good’ equilibrium.  Within the latter, the state attains the fiscal 
space to provide the basic state services such as security to person and property to 
provide the preconditions for investments and growth of the economy.  Meanwhile norms 
of behavior take root to cement such expectations of the now functioning state.  It is the 
latter that act as a back-stop against rollback into conflict once donor support is 
withdrawn.   
 
  33Success at rebuilding post-conflict states of the 21
st Century is less than enviable.  While 
it may be too early to pass judgment on the ongoing post-conflict rescue missions, we 
have argued for greater clarity in terms of the length of commitment and the goals of such 
engagement.  For the four cases considered here, the commitment of resources and 
timeframe under consideration fall well short of our estimates of what may be minimally 
necessary.  A longer time frame for engagement in these states and greater clarity on the 
criteria for exit opens up new options on what may be done in post-conflict 
reconstruction.  This would involve doing different things to those done currently; greater 
support to the recurrent budget is a case in point.  It would also entail the handing back of 
sovereignty commensurate with the revenue raising capacity of the intervened state– a 
clearer path to exit than what is visible now. 
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(N/A)  N/A 89.15  37.84  Unranked 
Angola 
15,941 
(2.87) 936.87  27.65  1.54  162 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
3,907  
(-.06) 1,647.32      5.24  66 
Burundi 
7,547  
(3.58) 104.64  48.3  46.79  167 
Cambodia 
14,071 
(1.96) 402.25  38.22  9.05  131 
Central African Republic 
4,037  
(1.29) 227.29  20.43  6.97  171 
Haiti 
8,527  
(1.43) 434.02  46.6  12.07  146 
Iraq N/A  N/A      N/A  Unranked 
Liberia 
3,283  
(1.31)  135.3 33  54.12 Unranked 
Mozambique 
19,792 
(1.88)  291.67 64  20.67  172 
Rwanda 
9,037  
(1.73)  260.14     27.06  161 
Solomon Islands 
477 
(2.53)  676.82 412.11 66.5  129 
Sudan 
36,232 
(1.98)  462.26 50.91  7.14  147 
Timor-Leste 
975 
(5.36)  345.16 185.38 33.47  150 
Selected MDG Indicators 
  
Literacy Rate 












Rate (DPT 3) 
Afghanistan 28.09  N/A  N/A  32.25  76 
Angola 67.41  41.42  154  N/A  47 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  96.66  74.41  13  N/A  93 
Burundi 59.3  44.65  114  35.74  74 
Cambodia 73.61  57.03  68  92.31  82 
Central African Republic  48.57  39.43  115  22.52  40 
Haiti 39.7  52.61  84  N/A  43 
Iraq 74.05  N/A  N/A  74.31  81 
Liberia 39.2  42.47  157  N/A  87 
Mozambique 33.5  41.81  100  42.02  72 
Rwanda 64.9  44.12  118  38.95  95 
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Solomon Islands  N/A  62.94  23.6  N/A  80 
Sudan 60.93  56.66  62  49.66  59 














Afghanistan 28574  (N/A)  N/A  89.15  37.84  Unranked 
Angola 15941  (2.87)  936.87  27.65  1.54  162 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  3907 (-.06)  1,647.32     5.24  66 
Burundi 7547.52  (3.58)  104.64  48.3  46.79  167 
Cambodia 14071.01  (1.96)  402.25  38.22  9.05  131 
Central African Republic  4037.75 (1.29)  227.29  20.43  6.97  171 
Haiti 8527.78  (1.43)  434.02  46.6  12.07  146 
Iraq N/A  N/A      N/A  Unranked 
Liberia 3283.27  (1.31)  135.3  33  54.12  Unranked 
Mozambique 19792.3  (1.88)  291.67  64  20.67  172 
Rwanda  9037.69 (1.73)  260.14     27.06  161 
Solomon Islands  477.74 (2.53)  676.82  412.11  66.5  129 
Sudan 36232.95  (1.98)  462.26  50.91  7.14  147 
Timor-Leste 975.54  (5.36)  345.16  185.38  33.47  150 
Selected MDG Indicators 
  
Literacy Rate 
(age 15 and 










Rate (DPT 3) 
Afghanistan 28.09  N/A  N/A  32.25  76 
Angola 67.41  41.42  154  N/A  47 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  96.66  74.41  13  N/A  93 
Burundi 59.3  44.65  114  35.74  74 
Cambodia 73.61  57.03  68  92.31  82 
Central African Republic  48.57  39.43  115  22.52  40 
Haiti 39.7  52.61  84  N/A  43 
Iraq 74.05  N/A  N/A  74.31  81 
Liberia 39.2  42.47  157  N/A  87 
Mozambique 33.5  41.81  100  42.02  72 
Rwanda 64.9  44.12  118  38.95  95 
Solomon Islands  N/A  62.94  23.6  N/A  80 
Sudan 60.93  56.66  62  49.66  59 
Timor-Leste N/A  56.72  51.5  N/A  55 
Source: WDI (Except when noted) 
* ODA Per Capita: from OECD DAC.  Subracted debt relief and emergency aid.  2005 USD.   
** Source: HDI Report 2007-2008 (http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf) 
*** Numbers are from 1990 for Haiti, Liberia, and Mozambique.   








Number of personnel 
deployed (at peak) 






International Security Assistance 
Force (UN, then NATO) (ISAF) 
32,600 (October, 
2006)  32,600 (October 2006)  1,130.1
Afghanistan** 
March, 2002 
UN Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) 
1004 (September, 





Force Multinationale de la 
Communaute Economique et 




Funded through African 




  39Country* 
Date of 
intervention 




Number of personnel 
deployed (at peak) 





UN Peace-building Office in the 
Central African Republic 
(BONUCA)  83 (June 2006) 
Funded through UN 
DPA (Department of 









February 2000  1,612 (Date Unknown)  101.3
Haiti 
June, 2004 
UN Stablilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH) 
9,453 (September 
2006)  9,453 (September 2006)  1,379.1
Liberia  September, 














(November 1993) and 










Number of personnel 
deployed (at peak) 






Regional Assistance Mission in the 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 
700 (September 
2006) 
Funded by RAMSI.  No 
personnel/past budget 
numbers available.****  159.4
July, 2000 
UN Mission in Support of East 
Timor/UN Transitional 
Administration in East Timor/UN 
Intigrated Mission in East Timor 
(UNMISET/UNTAET/UNMIT) 
822 (September 
2006) 12,650  (July  2000)  1,600.4
Timor Leste 
May, 2006  Operation Astute 
920 (November 
2006)  1,300 (May 2006) 
No budget numbers yet 
available.  
Total           80,343 7,847.4
* All data taken from Annual Review of Global Peace Operations (2007). Center for International Cooperation. ** Data for budget taken from UK Armed Forces Documents 
(http://www.armedforces.co.uk/mod/listings/l0024.html). ***Includes past expenditures plus current budget (for all countries last budget year was 2006, Haiti, Liberia, Timor-Leste last budget year was 
2007).  **** When no past budget numbers were available, simply used the current budget number to estimate total cost of deployment. 
 Table 3: Reconstruction Commitments  
 
Country Pledging  Conference  (Date) 
Amount Pledged (2005 $ 
billions) 
Afghanistan  Tokyo January 21-22nd, 2002 1.834
Angola Brussels    1.000
Bosnia  
December 1995 and April 
1996 2.276
Burundi  Geneva December 2001  0.839
Cambodia  Tokyo, June 22nd, 1992  1.145
Haiti  Washington, July 20th, 2004  1.118
Kosovo  Brussels, July 28th, 1999  2.297
Liberia 
New York, February 6th, 
2004 0.536
Mozambique  Geneva, February 1987  0.507
Rwanda  Geneva, August 2nd, 1994  0.271
Sudan 
Oslo, Norway, April 11th, 
2005 4.500
Timor Leste  Tokyo, 1999, Lisbon, 2000  0.588
Total      16.91
Data source: International and National News Sources.  Specific citations available from the authors upon request.   
 
Table 4: Per Capita GNI and recurrent expenditure, and tax take for 2005. 
Country Per  Capita  GDP 
(2005 USD) 
Per Capita Recurrent 
Expenditure (2005 USD) 
Tax Take in 2005 (% 
of GDP) 
Liberia 167  63.13  14.5 
Mozambique 335  67.20    13.6 
Solomon Islands  624  545.36  24.7 
Timor-Leste 366  196.90  9.5 
Source: GNI and tax take data is from WDI (online) while recurrent expenditure are estimates generated by 
the authors.  Appendix 2 provides details on the last. 
 
Table 5: Year of and tax-take at exit, and cost-benefit ratios – best case scenario. 
Country  Year of donor 
exit  
Tax take at exit 
(percent of GDP) 




Liberia  2018   21  761   10:1  
Mozambique  2010   16  805   57:1  
Solomon Islands  2028   29  1982   1:2  
Timor-Leste  2026   20  2051   1:1  
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
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Afghanistan   2001  2001 N/A N/A  
Central African 
Republic   1996  1998 -2.06% -1.02%
(1998 to 
2005) 
Haiti   2004  2004 -0.65% 0.27%
(2004 to 
2005) 
Liberia   1989  2003 -3.72% 1.95%
(2003 to 
2005) 
Mozambique   1975  1992 N/A 4.94%
(1992 to 
2005) 
Solomon Islands   1999  2003 0.67% 2.48%
(2003 to 
2005) 
Timor-Leste 1999  2000 N/A -2.60%
(2000 to 
2005) 
Notes: Growth rate computed as average of the annual compound rate from beginning to end of period. 
 
Table 7: Year of and tax-take at exit, and cost-benefit ratios – based on historical (post 
conflict) annualized average growth rate. 
Country 
(post-conflict per 
capita growth rate) 










2027   26  1200   7:1  
Mozambique 
(4.9%) 
2010   16  811   57:1  
Solomon Islands 
(2.48%) 
2046   33  2709   1:2  
Timor-Leste 
(-2.6%) 
+∞   40 (ceiling?)  6563 (?)   1:4 (?)  
Notes: Growth estimate for Mozambique of 4.94 percent instead of 5 has been assumed 
as shown in Table 6 above.  Source: Authors’ estimates. 
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GDPPC
 
Note: gtepc denotes government total per capita consumption expenditure; GDPPC 
denotes per capita GDP; and, both variables are measured in 2000 US$.  See Appendix 
for details on sources of the data. 












- 1 0 - 9 - 8 - 7 - 6 - 5 - 4 - 3 - 2 - 10123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4






























MOZ LBR SLB TMP
 
Notes: Intervention marks Year = 0, this being 1992 for Mozambique (MOZ), 2003 for 
Liberia (LBR) and the Solomon Islands (SLB), and 1999 for East Timor (TMP); absence 
of data for Liberia and East Timor disallows the above to be depicted in purchasing 
power parity adjusted terms. Data source: World development Indicators (online), 
accessed on 28 September, 2007. 

































General government consumption Aid 
 
Aid spike from 2000 to 2003 due to devastating floods, reported as the worst in 50 years, 
that hit the country in February and March of 2000 – see IMF, 2007 (page 12).  The 2005 
per capita government expenditure in 2000$ is 91; this value is assumed as the minimal 
necessary (the steady state value) to enable the state provide basic (state) services. 



































Data source: World Development Indicators database (online). Notes: p.c. GC denotes 
per capita government consumption. 
 
































The starting values for per capita GDP and average tax take as a percent of GDP is for 
2005.  The values for the subsequent years are generated with the assumption that tax-
take as a share of GDP rises by half a percentage point each year and that per capita GDP 
growth is maintained at 5 percent per annum.  See Table 4 for assumptions regarding tax 
take and recurrent outlays. 
Source: authors’ estimates 
 
 
  48Data Appendix I 
Table A1: Variable names and descriptions 
Variable Description  Units  of 
measurement
Expense  Expense is cash payments for operating activities of the 
government in providing goods and services. It includes 
compensation of employees (such as wages and salaries), 
interest and subsidies, grants, social benefits, and other 
expenses such as rent and dividends. 
International Monetary Fund, Government Finance 
Statistics Yearbook and data files, and World Bank and 





Series: General government final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP) (NE.CON.GOVT.ZS)  
General government final consumption expenditure 
(formerly general government consumption) includes all 
government current expenditures for purchases of goods 
and services (including compensation of employees). It 
also includes most expenditures on national defense and 
security, but excludes government military expenditures 
that are part of government capital formation. 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD 





GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in 
the value of the products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for 
depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are 
in constant 2000 U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are 
converted from domestic currencies using 2000 official 
exchange rates. For a few countries where the official 
exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied 
to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative 
conversion factor is used. 
World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National 






GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by 
midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in 
the value of the products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for 
depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are 
Constant 
2000 US$ 
  49in constant U.S. dollars. 
World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National 
Accounts data files. 
GDP, PPP $, 
2000 
PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to 
international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. 
An international dollar has the same purchasing power 
over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. 
GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 
2000 international dollars. 









Revenue is cash receipts from taxes, social contributions, 
and other revenues such as fines, fees, rent, and income 
from property or sales. Grants are also considered as 
revenue but are excluded here. 
International Monetary Fund, Government Finance 
Statistics Yearbook and data files, and World Bank and 
OECD GDP estimates. 
% of GDP 
Tax revenue  Tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to the central 
government for public purposes. Certain compulsory 
transfers such as fines, penalties, and most social security 
contributions are excluded. Refunds and corrections of 
erroneously collected tax revenue are treated as negative 
revenue. 
International Monetary Fund, Government Finance 
Statistics Yearbook and data files, and World Bank and 
OECD GDP estimates. 
% of GDP 
Source: World Development Indicators (online) database 
 
Table A1: Summary statistics on variables used, full country sample (2000-04) 
Variable Obs 
($) 
Mean ($)  CoV.(%)  Min ($)  Max ($) 
GDP per capita (2000$)  185  6345  147  85 48298 
GDP per capita (2000$ PPP)  169  8905  107  565  49594 
Govt. per capita 
consumption expenditure 
(2000$) 
115 2443  144  7  17545 
Expense (% of GDP)  118  27  37  8  54 
Revenue (% of GDP)  119  26  42  5  53 
Note: CoV denotes coefficient of variation. 
  50Appendix II: Explanatory notes on how recurrent outlays were computed 
Recurrent outlays as of 2005 have been computed by combining data from government 
budgets, IMF Article IV reports, and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
database.  The level of “recurrent expenditures” for 2005 is the sum total of expenditures 
on recurrent provisions by the state and the donors.  Data for the first of the above has 
been extracted from the budget.  Data on the second has been extracted from DAC 
database.   
East Timor 
In the case of Timor-Leste, the fiscal year is from July 1
st to the 30
th of June.  Thus, the 
average of 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 budget figures were used to calculate recurrent 
expenditures for the 2005 calendar year.  This data was derived from The Democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste Combined Sources Budget 2004-2005: Budget Paper Number 
One (May 2004).   
Liberia 
Liberia’s fiscal year is also from July 1
st to 30
th of June.  Here, we use Liberia’s 2006-
2007 recurrent budget expenditures since those for 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 are not 
unavailable.  The 2006 figures were deflated by 7.25 percent, the average reported 
inflation for the period, to get recurrent expenditures in 2005-dollars.  The level of extra-
budgetary donor funding of recurrent outlays is calculated as the difference between the 
reported figures for ‘extraordinary ordinary revenues’ in the budget and that reported by 
DAC but net of emergency aid.   
 
 
  51Mozambique 
Mozambique’s fiscal year extends from January 1
st to December 31
st.  We use 
Mozambique’s 2005 budget.
16 Recurrent outlays are calculated as Despesa para 
Funcionamento (Operational Expenditures) net of Despesas de Capital (Capital 
Expenditures).  The resulting figures are converted from Meticais to U.S. Dollars using 
an average of IMF exchange rates for the end 2004 and 2005.  Table A (p 3) of the 
Budget also lists grants and loans, so we are able to perform the same calculation 
concerning ODA that we made for Liberia.
17   
Solomon Islands 
For Solomon Islands, budget figures were extracted from the Central Bank of the 
Solomon Islands website.
18  These figures were converted into US dollars using an 
average of IMF exchange rates for 2004 and 2005.  A similar exercise to that carried out 
for Liberia and Mozambique was done to calculate the level of extra-budgetary support 
provided by donors to fund recurrent provisions. 
 
 
                                                 
16 Available online at http://www.govnet.gov.mz/docs_gov/orcamento/fo_oge2005/).  
17 We assume that all loans Mozambique lists are counted as ODA, in keeping with the principle of 
estimating conservative recurrent expenditures per person to yield lower-bound estimates of time to exit.     
18 http://www.cbsi.com.sb/fileadmin/PDF/reports/Areports/2006AR.pdf, page 38.   
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